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Obesity is too serious to leave it to doctors and politicians alone:  
an economist perspective
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The government has predicted the tax 
will raise £520m in its first year, although 
the government’s aim with the new tax  
is to promote a change in eating habits, 
not to raise revenue
A new tax on sugary drinks in the UKIn 2018, a new sugar tax on the soft drinks industry will be introduced in the UK, the 
government has announced in the 2016 budget.  
It will be imposed on companies according to the 
volume of the sugar-sweetened drinks they produce  
or import. There will be two bands – one for total sugar 
content above 5g per 100 millilitres and a second, 
higher band for the most sugary drinks with more 
than 8g per 100 millilitres. Analysis by the Office  
for Budgetary Responsibility suggests they will be 
levied at 18 pence and 24 pence per litre of marketed 
product (Triggle, 2016).
The tax will come into force in 2018 and will cost 
£1bn to implement. The government has predicted 
the tax will raise £520m in its first year (Ruddick, 
2016). The government’s aim with the new tax  
is to promote a change in eating habits, not to  
raise revenue. The tax receipts are earmarked for:
1.  Doubling of dedicated sport funding  
for every primary school in the country, 
2. Expansion of breakfast clubs, and 
3. New funding for a longer school day. 
The new levy will not be introduced until 2018, 
giving companies plenty of time to change product 
mix and reduce sugar content (Triggle, 2016).
This tax increase has been hailed by campaigners 
as a significant step in the fight against obesity. One 
of the most high-profile supporters of this campaign 
has been television chef Jamie Oliver, who has 
introduced a sugar levy in his restaurants from July 
2015. Until March 2016 this levy collected £50,000. 
The money has been transferred to a Charity installing 
water fountains in schools (see jamieoliver.com). 
There is no information available, however, as to 
whether this levy actually reduced sugary drinks 
consumption at restaurants where it was introduced.
At the same time, however, Gavin Partington, 
director-general of the British Soft Drinks Association, 
an industry body, stated that the tax is ill-conceived  
as the taxpayers and consumers will pay more to 
introduce and run the scheme than the government 
will receive as revenue. He also mentioned a possible 
shift in consumption pattern as milk-based sugary 
drinks will not be included in the new tax (Conroy, 
2016).
Obesity in the UK
It is true that obesity is an important, expensive 
problem. There is a wide body of medical literature 
indicating that obesity can have a severe impact on 
people’s health, increasing the risk of type 2 diabetes, 
some cancers, and heart and liver disease. From the 
financial point of view, obesity is a greater burden  
on the UK’s economy than armed violence, war and 
terrorism, costing the country $73 billion a year – in 
fact obesity has the second-largest economic impact 
on the UK behind smoking, generating an annual loss 
equivalent to 3% of GDP (Dodds, 2014). Figure 1 
(overleaf, top) shows a continuous increase in 
obesity rates in England.
Overweight and obesity are terms that refer  
to an excess of body fat and they usually relate to 
increased weight-for-height. The most common 
method of measuring obesity is the Body Mass Index 
(BMI). BMI is calculated by dividing a person’s weight 
measurement (in kilograms) by the square of their 
height (in metres). BMI is the most effective way to 
measure the prevalence of obesity at the population 
level. No specialised equipment is needed and 
therefore it is easy to measure accurately and 
consistently across large populations. BMI is  
also widely used around the world which enables 
comparisons between countries, regions and 
population sub-groups. In adults, a BMI of 25kg/m2 
to 29.9kg/m2 means that a person is considered  
to be overweight, and a BMI of 30kg/m2 or above 
means that a person is considered to be obese.  
Obesity is a complex issue which does not 
respond to simplistic explanations. The proposed  
tax addresses only one cause – sugar consumption 
in selected drinks, while ignoring other factors, such 
as total amount and structure of calories consumed, 
level of physical activity, types of food consumed 
(processed vs fresh) and many others.
How the new tax should work?
The government’s intention is clear: by 
increasing the price of sugary drinks, it hopes that the 
customers will buy less of them and this would reduce 
the calorie intake to finally lead to a reduction  
in obesity. 
However, economics is never that simple.  
The chart overleaf (Figure 2) is based on several 
assumptions and it does not seem that the UK 
government thoroughly analysed the complexity of 
the issue (or at least such analysis was not presented 
to the public). The first assumption is that producers 
will pass the tax to consumers, thus increasing the 
price of the product. While this assumption is in 
perfect accordance with classic economic theory,  
it does not address the issue of when producers  
will pass the price increase. For reasons related to 
maintaining market share or the volume of sales, 
manufacturers may decide to absorb the tax rather 
than pass it on to customers in the form of higher 
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prices. If this happens, industry profits will decline but 
sales would not be expected to fall. When Berkeley, 
California introduced a soda tax in 2015, reseachers 
found that retail prices rose by less than half of the 
amount of the tax. 
Another assumption is that normal price 
elasticity of demand, i.e. that the demand will go 
down in line with price increases. However, even if 
prices do increase, consumers may value the product 
enough to absorb higher prices by making cuts in 
other parts of their household budget. This is a basic 
concept of price elasticity of demand which is taught 
in every Introductory Economics course. The UK 
government did not present any research on price 
elasticity of demand for sugary drinks. We have, 
however, some data from other countries. In Finland, 
when the price of soft drinks rose by 7.3 per cent for 
two years running, consumption fell by less than one 
per cent in the first year and by 3.1 per cent in the 
second year (ECSIP, 2014).
Learning from Denmark
I now turn to the Danish experience to 
examine the complexities related to the food taxes. 
An important potential problem with ‘sugar tax’ is 
the substitution effect. Consumers respond to the 
tax by switching to cheaper brands of the product  
or shopping in cheaper shops. If the tax is levied at a 
very high rate it might even drive consumers towards 
the black market. Consumers who downshift to 
cheaper brands will suffer a welfare loss from the 
consumption of inferior goods but will not consume 
fewer calories and therefore will be no less likely  
to be obese. Alternatively, consumers may buy  
less of the targeted product but buy more of other 
high-calorie products. For example, they might 
consume less lemonade but buy more beer, or they 
might purchase less cola but buy more chocolate.  
As a result of these substitution effects, the tax  
leads to fewer sales of one product without reducing 
calorie consumption as it is compensated by  
a higher consumption of another products.
The Danish National Health and Medicines 
Authority reports that only 13.4% of the Danes 
 are obese which compares with 23% of the UK 
residents and the OECD average of 16.9% (Sassi, 
2012). As a proof that sugary drinks are not the 
FIGURE 1: Obesity (BMI 30+) prevalence among adults (16+) in England 1993 – 2013. Source: Niblett, 2015: 12; 
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An important potential problem with ‘sugar  
tax’ is the substitution effect. Consumers respond  
to the tax by switching to cheaper brands of  
the product or shopping in cheaper shops.  
If the tax is levied at a very high rate it might  
even drive consumers towards the black market
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only factor contributing to increased obesity, it is 
interesting to compare the consumption of soft drinks 
between Denmark and the UK. As the below figure 
shows, the per capita consumption of Coca-Cola 
products (i.e. mostly carbonated, sugary drinks) was 
very similar in both countries, yet the obesity rates are 
markedly different.
In October 2011, following an intensive public 
debate and a medical research programme which 
identified fat content as a main health concern in  
the country, Denmark became the first country in  
the world to introduce a ‘fat tax’ on meat, dairy 
products and cooking oil.  It was an excise duty of 16 
kroners (equivalent to 2.1 Euros or £1.81) per kilogram 
of meat, dairy products or cooking oils containing  
more than 2.3 per cent of saturated fat (Trovato and 
Quaglino, 2013). The ‘fat tax’ was portrayed as a 
levy designed to discourage unhealthy eating habits 
and help pay towards the putative costs of obesity. 
The money raised was originally earmarked for the 
health service, although this was dropped within weeks 
of its introduction on the grounds that such taxes  
are an unstable and fluctuating source of income.
During the first three months after the tax  
was introduced, the sale of butter, butter mixes and 
margarine fell 10-15% in Denmark with butter being 
the only statistically significant observation. It is, 
however, unclear, to what extend this drop is a direct 
result of the ‘fat tax’. This figure comes from a study 
which looked at the first three months of the new  
tax regime when consumers were using up the large 
number of products they had hoarded in the  
days before prices rose (Jensen and Smed, 2013). 
Researchers who have looked at the whole timeframe 
have found that the decline in sales was much lower 
than 10-15 per cent (ECSIP, 2014). Moreover, such 
data must be seen in a wider context of consumer 
trends. The vice president of the Danish Grocers’ Trade 
Organisation (DSK) Claus Bøgelund Nielsen stated in 
ECSIP (2014: 36), that the fall in butter consumption 
had nothing to do with the fat tax but there has 
been a small annual decrease in butter consumption 
for years due to healthier lifestyles. He compared it to 
a decrease of full milk consumption (fully-taxed) which 
has been substituted by skimmed, semi-skimmed  
milk or sweetened yoghurt or milk-based drinks 
(not affected by ‘fat tax’).
By far the biggest change in customer behaviour 
was an impact on shopping patterns. Due to 
geography of the country, Danes have a strong 
propensity to search for lower cost products in 
Germany and Sweden. Cross-border purchases had 
been declining before the ‘fat tax’ was enacted. They 
peaked at 15.6 billion kroner (£1.8 billion) in 2005 
before steadily falling to 9.6 billion kroner (£1.1 billion) 
in 2011. The Danish Ministry of Taxation estimated 
that the overall border trade rose in 2012 to 10.5 
billion kroner. Preliminary evidence suggested that the 
fat tax led to cross-border sales rising by the equivalent 
of 100 million kroner (£12 million) per year and rose 
thereafter (Smed and Robertson, 2012). The Danish 
Government withdrew the tax in January 2013.
A behavioural economics perspective
It has been suggested that possibly the best 
solution is to leave people in peace to enjoy their  
own little indulgences, including the amount of fat or 
sugar consumed.  After all, sugary drinks are already 
taxed at the top VAT rate.  It is, however, likely that  
this solution will result in ever-growing waist-lines  
and costs to the tax payer.  The opinion that the  
best solution is to leave a purchasing decision to a 
customer, is based on an established view in classical 
economics, that people can take rational decisions.  
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FIGURE 2: Intended effect of sugary drinks tax
Higher tax leading to higher shelf price 
Lower sales induced by higher price lead  
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For a tax to achieve its aims, it must be significant 
enough so that it will lead to retail price increases 
which will be felt by customers. A large tax would 
simply prompt people to switch to other sugary 
drinks that are not taxed
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In contrast the new field of behavioural 
economics proposes an alternative to the rational 
model of traditional economics. A number of books, 
journal articles and empirical studies have been 
published exploring human irrationality in decision-
making, beliefs and actions. One of the observations 
of this new branch of economics is that people are 
susceptible to cues in the environment that affect 
their behaviour – a fact that governments and 
businesses can use to frame and promote healthy 
behaviour and wiser choices. 
Obesity in New York
I turn to the USA to examine the case of obesity 
from this new perspective. In the USA, over half of the 
New York City’s adults, and close to 40% of the City’s 
public elementary and middle school students, are 
obese.  Thomas Farley, Commissioner of New York 
City’s Health Department, indicated that ‘obesity 
leads to the deaths of nearly 6,000 New Yorkers a 
year, more than any health problem except smoking, 
according to our best estimates’ (Arumungan, 2012).
To address this issue, a large scale experiment  
in framing principle was planned to take place in 
New York in March 2012, as Mayor Bloomberg’s 
administration tried to impose a ban on selling sugary 
drinks in servings larger than 16 oz servings (about 0.5 
litre) in cinemas, restaurants, sports venues and mobile 
food carts.  If a customer wanted to drink more of their 
favourite drink, they would have to order two (or more) 
servings (Arumungan, 2012). Bloomberg’s plans fell 
through due to invalidation of the regulation by New 
York Supreme Court on 11 March, 2013. The legal 
battle ended on 26 June 2014, when the New York 
Court of Appeals, the state’s highest court, ruled that 
the New York City Board of Health, in adopting the 
Sugary Drinks Portion Cap Rule, exceeded the scope  
of its regulatory authority.
The initial acceptance of this proposal by the 
New York’s Health City Board, in a rare unanimous 
vote, may be seen as a victory for the paternalistic 
approach of Mayor Bloomberg, but also as a victory 
for sound economics.  Bloomberg’s proposal applies 
the economic concept of default bias and framing:  
if you offer a choice in which one option is seen as  
a default, most people go for that ‘default’ as it is 
simpler, requires less effort from people and links to 
what is commonly known as people’s ‘herd’ instincts.  
The new regulation limiting the maximum size for  
the drink simply frames the 16oz size differently for 
customers; if they want more, they’ll have to make  
an extra effort and dare to be different. 
The research shows that humans do not hold 
opinions of their own on such matters and will look 
for hints and suggestions - like the size of a cup – 
to instruct them. In Tversky and Simonson’s (1993) 
classic experiment, people were first offered two 
cameras: one basic and one with more features. 
Initially the choice was more or less equally divided 
between the two cameras. Then a third choice was 
added – a very expensive and sophisticated camera. 
This led to about 50% of people choosing the 
mid-range camera (the remaining 50% was  
almost equally split between basic and sophisticated 
cameras). The mid-range simply looked less 
extravagant. We can infer that if a super-size (32oz) 
is no longer available and now is replaced by 16 oz, 
maybe a standard size (12oz) will now be seen as the 
most desirable option. The thinking in this case is as 
follows: if a consumer has a choice of 12, 16 or  
32 oz servings, the majority of consumers will select 
16oz, while the rest will be equally split between  
12 and 32oz. If, however, we reduce the choice and 
offer instead to only 12 or 16oz, then customers will 
split their choices equally between the serving sizes, 
reducing therefore the total consumption of soda, 
even if we account for repeat purchases by some 
customers (note that it would take 3 purchases of 
12oz serving to match just one super-size of 36 oz), 
so it would take three times the customer’s effort in 
case of 12 oz to consume the same amount of 
sugary drink.
Although the legal battle in New York has been 
lost, it has already created a welcomed effect. In 
September 2014, at the Clinton Global Initiative’s 
annual conference in Manhattan, several beverages 
manufacturers, including Coca-Cola, PepsiCo and  
the Dr Pepper Snapple Group voluntarily pledged  
to reduce US calorie consumption in sugary drinks  
by an average of 20% by 2025 (Saul, 2015).
Where from here?
Going back to the proposed UK bill on sugary 
drinks, I propose that this is the wrong answer to a very 
real problem. First, as admitted by the government 
and supported by evidence from Denmark, the tax 
initially will cost more than it will bring in as the annual 
revenue. Even in later years, the actual cost of this tax 
would be high in proportion to revenue raised. Based 
on discussed examples, the tax will not work because 
of price elasticity of demand and substitutions issues. 
For a tax to achieve its aims, it must be significant 
enough so that it will lead to retail price increases 
which will be felt by customers. The current average 
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retail price of a 2 liters bottle of Coca Cola in London 
is £1.84 (based on Internet comparison prices), so the 
new tax, if passed fully to consumers, would result in  
a price of £ 2.32, a 26% increase. Without a data on 
price elasticity, it is impossible to assess whether this 
change will lead to reduced purchases. A large tax, the 
Danish example shows, would simply prompt people 
to switch to other sugary drinks that are not taxed.  
In the proposed regulation the government clearly 
leaves the gates wide-open for a switch described 
above by not taxing milk-based drinks (smoothies) 
and fruit juices. 
On the other hand, however, it is difficult to 
ignore the expanding waistlines and associated 
 cost to the taxpayer. I suggest that a behavioural 
approach to dealing with obesity offers the 
acceptable mid-way solution – the individual’s rights 
to select what he/she eats and drinks are not affected. 
This approach would involve reducing the available 
bottle size for sugar-based drinks, i.e. elimination  
of large size, 2 litre bottles and a ban on selling bulk 
packaging, such as sets of 8 cans, offering instead 
only sets of four. Customers retain their right to 
choose, yet they have to make more effort to do so, 
thus hopefully reducing their consumption of sugary 
drinks and, possibly, lowering the burden on health 
finances.
It may be advisable in this perspective,  
to convince a new Mayor of London to start an 
experiment and reduce the size of drinks served in 
London’s restaurants and other food establishments 
– simply following the New York’s attempt. Can we 
survive without unlimited soda fountain at some 
restaurants such as Nandos? Should we have 1 litre 
maximum bottle size of any sugary soft drink sold  
in our supermarkets? The time is ripe to take such 
measures to inform and influence consumers about 
obesity. The government should also involve the 
industry in this debate – and, based on the discussed 
voluntary pledge within Clinton Global Initiative, 
major companies are willing to engage in a 
meaningful conversation. They have undertaken  
a major commitment in the US, so why not ask 
them to do the same in the UK?
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